The reasoning-based approach championed by Francois Osiurak and Arnaud Badets (Osiurak & Badets, 2016) denies the existence of sensory-motor memories of tool use except in limited circumstances, and suggests instead that most tool use is subserved solely by online technical reasoning about tool properties. In this commentary, I highlight the strengths and limitations of the reasoning-based approach and review a number of lines of evidence that manipulation knowledge is in fact used in tool action tasks. In addition, I present a "two route" neurocognitive model of tool use called the "Two Action Systems Plus (2ASϩ)" framework that posits a complementary role for online and stored information and specifies the neurocognitive substrates of task-relevant action selection. This framework, unlike the reasoning based approach, has the potential to integrate the existing psychological and functional neuroanatomic data in the tool use domain.
Professors Francois Osiurak and Arnaud Badets (Osiurak & Badets, 2016) have developed a detailed and thoughtful argument suggesting that technical reasoning about how tools are used on objects is the sole basis for human tool use. Because it denies the existence of sensory-motor memories of tool use ("manipulation knowledge") except perhaps in limited circumstances, the reasoning-based account is controversial. In this commentary, I will review the central claims of the Osiurak and Badets (hereafter, O ϩ B) account, focusing in particular on the areas in which there is the most tension with the dominant competing account, the "two route" account. I then present a two-stream functional neuroanatomic model of tool use that incorporates some of the mechanisms proposed by O ϩ B, but expands upon these to include a role for manipulation knowledge, with resulting ability to accommodate a wider range of observations from the literature on tool-related behaviors. I will then discuss O ϩ B's claims of evidence against manipulation-based accounts, and provide evidence to the contrary.
The Reasoning-Based Approach to Tool Use
The pivotal claim of the O ϩ B account is that, People reason about the physical object properties to solve everyday life activities. This reasoning is based on mechanical knowledge (e.g., cutting, lever, percussion), which corresponds to knowledge about physical principles. . . . Mechanical knowledge is in charge of forming a mental simulation of the tool-use action (i.e., expected perceptual effect; e.g., a knife cutting a tomato), then constraining the perception of the affordances suited for the intended action. Finally, motor simulation is used to assess the cost associated with the use and to decide whether the solution produced is beneficial for the organism. (p. 7)
A fundamental merit of this approach, according to O ϩ B, is that "it allows us to reason about physical object properties, regardless of whether tools are familiar or novel" (p. 7).
To my understanding, then, the O ϩ B account claims that the first step in any tool use task is that knowledge of physical principles are used to form a dynamic visual simulation of the tool use action being performed on a recipient object (in this example, a disembodied knife moving back and forth in space, cutting a tomato). This visual imagery of a tool action in space is the basis for the narrowing of attention upon relevant object affordances (in this example, the handle of the knife). The specification of relevant affordances (handle) plus the simulation of visual movement of the tool vis a vis the recipient object together are sufficient to specify a simulated motor plan (hand clenching the handle, arm moving to and fro with flexion about the elbow joint). The steps required to translate between a disembodied visual image of a tool movement and a motor plan are only broadly specified. That is, a critical missing piece in the O ϩ B account is how sensory-motor actions can be simulated when there is no stored sensory-motor represenSome of the ideas in this article have been discussed briefly in previous publications (Binkofski & Buxbaum, 2013; . Figure 3 was previously published in Watson and Buxbaum (2015) and Figure 4 was published in Kalénine et al. (2014) ; both are reproduced with permission. All other text, tables, and figures have not been previously published. This work was supported by the National Institutes of Health (NIH R01 NS065409 and R01 NS099061), the Albert Einstein Society of Einstein Healthcare Network, Philadelphia, PA, and the Moss Rehabilitatation of ever having performed the action before. Most influential accounts specifying "internal models" for the purpose of action prediction explicitly describe mechanisms for learning and tuning these sensory-motor models (e.g., Friston, 2011; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000) , and the O ϩ B account glosses over this important point.
Following from this, perhaps the most controversial claim of the account is that upon specification of the motor plan, both the visual image of the tool moving in space and sensory-motor information are discarded:
The reasoning-based approach suggests that mechanical knowledge is necessary to generate a mental simulation of the use (i.e., expected perceptual effect). . . . Then, movements can be controlled on-line from this expected perceptual effect. The key issue is, however, how long this mental simulation can be maintained in working memory, before reasoning is required to recreate it. One possibility is that the simulation of the expected perceptual effect is temporary and systematically fades away. A second, more likely, possibility is that it is maintained only until the simulation of another effect is generated (e.g., spreading butter). (p. 27) Thus, the next time the actor wants to cut food with a knife, she must repeat the visual imagery, affordance specification, and motor imagery steps de novo. There would then be no savings in time or effort over repeated occurrences of cutting with a knife.
Moreover, Table 1 in the O ϩ B article indicates that intention is required to activate these steps. The clear implication is that when the actor encounters a knife in a context in which foodcutting is not the goal (e.g., perhaps when washing the dishes), there is no activation of the visual simulation, affordance specification, or motor simulation processing stages.
In contrast to this "on line" reasoning-based sequence that occurs with tools having obvious affordances for action, O ϩ B invoke procedural learning to explain our knowledge of the use of less obviously mechanical (more arbitrarily used) tools such as phones and computers. This is an important discontinuity, and a place in which I think the reasoning-based approach boxes itself in, as I discuss below in the section titled "The role of motor learning in tool use."
One of the strengths of the O ϩ B account is that it provides reconciliation with evidence that tool-using animals (including humans) appear to engage in "folk physics" wherein principles such as leverage and force are used for "extractive foraging"-obtaining food that would be inaccessible with the body alone (van Schaik, Deaner, & Merrill, 1999) . In addition, its incorporation of visual simulations of how objects are predicted to move represents a modification of powerful current accounts of predictive processing in sensorimotor control of body movements (e.g., Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000) . The reasoning-based account helps pave the way to exploration of how visual simulations of tool movements are related to visual and sensory-motor simulations of body movements. For example, are these tool and body simulations activated in parallel, or rather serially, as the O ϩ B account claims?
From the outset, then, it is important to be clear that technical reasoning (i.e., visual simulation plus knowledge of physical principles) may indeed be one of the mechanisms enabling tool use, and much of what we know about this mechanism may be credited to the work of Osiurak and colleagues. But, as argued by Frey (2007) , humans uniquely engage in a large repertoire of complex tool use skills, manufacture complex tools from multiple parts and materials, and create one tool to make another (e.g., sharpening stones to cut wooden spears). Humans also recognize tool actions, name tool actions, jointly engage in tool actions with other persons (e.g., using a long two-handled saw), learn new tool actions, and train other humans to perform them. The explosion in our capacities and flexibility with regard to tools requires a memory system that can catalogue and "distill" these vast experiences. Perhaps most importantly, the capacity to remember tool actions makes it easier and faster to perform these actions a second time.
Following from this, there are a great number of findings consistent with the activation of sensory-motor memories of tool use in both action and nonaction tasks. O ϩ B partially acknowledge this:
As discussed, a significant body of literature suggests that transport and use actions might be based on structural representations and manipulation knowledge, respectively. In addition, the reasoningbased approach appears to be inappropriate to account for most of these findings, notably because this approach does not make any prediction as to how people process information about tools when no real actions is required (e.g., naming, object recognition, semantic categorization). (p. 25) Thus, to accommodate the evidence that manipulation knowledge appears to be activated in action recognition, object recognition, and semantic categorization tasks, the reasoning-based approach posits a second discontinuity: between technical reasoning subserving tool use tasks but not other tasks involving tools, and manipulation knowledge used only in nonaction tasks but not in tool manipulation tasks. However, O ϩ B do not offer a response to the evidence (that we will review below in the section titled "The role of semantic memory in tool use") that sensory-motor memories of tool use are also activated in action tasks. Moreover, as we will describe, there is evidence that it is during action tasks This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
that these representations are learned to begin with. Finally, it is puzzling why the brain would store information about how to skillfully manipulate tools (as evidenced by numerous naming, object recognition, gesture recognition, and semantic categorization findings, see below), but then fail to take advantage of this knowledge when actually using tools. That is, any account of the cognitive substrates of tool manipulation must address the substantial evidence supporting tool manipulation knowledge, and defend the logic of the posited "disconnect" between tool manipulation knowledge and actual tool use.
Brief Overview of the Two Action Systems Plus (2AS؉) Account of Tool Use
O ϩ B synthesize the work of a number of investigators in their characterization of the two-route approach, but work from my laboratory-as well as the research of Anna Borghi and colleagues, (e.g., Borghi & Riggio, 2009; Thill, Caligiore, Borghi, Ziemke, & Baldassarre, 2013) and the sympathetic account of Van Elk, van Schie, and Bekkering (van Elk, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2014) -is weighted particularly heavily in their analysis. O ϩ B refer to this group of accounts as the "manipulation-based" approach, but describing them under the rubric of the "two route" approach more accurately captures the rich interactivity of both stored and online information in tool use.
My response to O ϩ B will attempt to clarify these and other current tenets of our updated theoretical account, which is termed the Two Action Systems Plus (2ASϩ) model, shown in graphical form in Figure 1 and Table 1 .
The model has its origin in prior prominent cognitive neuropsychological models of "direct" (or nonsemantic) and "indirect" (or semantic) routes to action (e.g., (Gonzalez Rothi, Ochipa, & Heilman, 1997; Rumiati & Humphreys, 1998) , and over a number of iterations continues to attempt to accommodate and reconcile contemporary neuropsychological, cognitive, and functional neuroanatomic evidence (e.g., Binkofski & Buxbaum, 2013; Buxbaum, 2001; . In brief, the model posits that there are two major sources of complementary and highly interactive information about how to use tools: a leftlateralized ventro-dorsal system that subserves manipulation knowledge, from which information is translated into a specific motor plan, and a bilateral dorso-dorsal system specialized for sensory-motor mapping; for example, the translation of information from vision to motor execution (Frey, 2007) . These systems, plus an inferior frontal gyrus-supramarginal gyrus (IFG/SMG) module that participates in action selection (hence, the "plus" in the model's name) are akin to the tool use network described by a number of other contemporary investigators (Bi et al., 2015; Gallivan, McLean, Valyear, & Culham, 2013; Johnson-Frey, Newman-Norland, & Grafton, 2005 ; J. W. Lewis, 2006; Orban & Caruana, 2014) . We believe that the cognitive architecture and computations of tool use are intimately informed by their neuroanatomic substrates, and vice versa. That is, learning shapes connectivity, and the innate predilection of different regions to process different types of information shapes the representational architecture. Hence, 2ASϩ is a neurocognitive model.
The central distinction between the reasoning-based and tworoute hypotheses is that the latter allows for complementarity of learning-based and online processes. Moreover, learning-based tool use reflects learning in a number of modalities: visual, tactile, kinesthetic, and motor. Thus, the term "manipulation knowledge" is shorthand for multisensory and motor memories learned when using objects and observing others using them. Manipulation knowledge is subserved primarily by the ventro-dorsal stream in the left hemisphere: the left posterior temporal lobe and its dense interconnections with parietal and thence frontal cortex along the arcuate fasciculus/superior longitudinal fasciculus (AF/SLF; Bi et al., 2015; Ramayya, Glasser, & Rilling, 2010) . The posterior temporal lobe encodes information about hand-tool relationships, possibly in a visuo-kinesthetic format (Bracci, Cavina-Pratesi, Ietswaart, Caramazza, & Peelen, 2012; Bracci & Peelen, 2013; Kalénine & Buxbaum, 2016; Tarhan, Watson, & Buxbaum, 2015) . This information about what hand-tool actions look and feel like (an aspect of manipulation knowledge) serves as a "desired state" or "goal state" template for inverse models that compute motor plans to achieve those states (see Figure 2) .
In any familiar tool use action, the learned representation must be adjusted to current environmental constraints, and it is here that the bilateral dorso-dorsal system plays a role. In the macaque, the dorso-dorsal stream runs from the superior parietal lobule (SPL) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS) to dorsal premotor areas, and is specialized for online sensory-motor control (Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003) . In the human, the dorso-dorsal pathway may include more of the IPL (a region that is greatly expanded in the human as compared with the monkey (see Vry et al., 2015) . During learning, it encodes statistical regularities in the input and maps them to statistical regularities in output (Hickok & Poeppel, 2000; Pickering & Garrod, 2013) . As a result, the dorso-dorsal system predicts the sensory (visual/tactile/kinesthetic/auditory) consequences of Figure 1 . Graphic depiction of the Two Action Systems Plus (2ASϩ) model of tool use. A left-lateralized posterior temporal/inferior parietal system subserves storage of abstract, multimodal manipulation knowledge (blue), which is translated into sensorimotor representations enabling tool use production in a bilateral frontoparietal network, with additional "tuning" based on current visual and somatosensory input (purple). The portion of the network specialized for action selection (green) subserves a biasing signal from the inferior frontal cortex that aids in selection of potential actions from a temporary repository or "buffer" in the left supramarginal gyrus. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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ones own motor commands. These predicted sensory consequences are compared with actual sensory input as movement unfolds, and any discrepancy between the two is used for online correction and refinement of the predictive model (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995) . This system is well suited to action imitation, even for unfamiliar actions (Buxbaum, Shapiro, & Coslett, 2014) , prediction of the time course of actions (Yang, 2015) , and the coordination of joint actions (Kokal, Gazzola, & Keysers, 2009) . The dorso-dorsal system reflects a possible point of contact between the technical reasoning approach and the two-route approach. Specifically, the technical reasoning approach posits computation of a mental simulation of the expected perceptual effect of tool use (i.e., a prediction of what the moving tool will look like). This appears to be a constrained version of the prediction used in other influential accounts cited above, which additionally posit that the brain computes the predicted tactile, visual, and kinesthetic consequences of ones own motor commands, and learns from the mismatch between predicted and actual consequences. Thus, the reasoning-based approach appears to include a unimodal (i.e., visual), learning-insensitive version of what is posited by many accounts of sensory-motor prediction.
Finally, there may be occasions in which the information computed by the two routes is in competition with one another. The dorso-dorsal stream makes predictions about future state of the body, objects, and environment based on current visual and somatosensory states, and the ventro-dorsal stream incorporates manipulation knowledge that generates visual, somatosensory, and abstract kinematic goal states (see Figure 2 ). Numerous candidate actions may be simultaneous activated. These may include different possible use actions (e.g., a hammering and "nail removal" action, both specified by retrieval of manipulation knowledge), or competing move versus use actions (a kitchen timer is picked up by its base to move it, but used by pinching and turning its dial). Candidate actions are prepared in parallel and briefly buffered in what we might term a "neural accumulator" (possibly in the left SMG) while biased competition, driven primarily by the IFG, enables selection of the most task relevant action, which then gains access to controlling the muscles of the effector (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010 ; see Figure 1 ).
Evidence for Two Routes to Action
A number of studies from laboratories other than our own have provided data supportive of the complementarity of stored and online information in tool use. A particularly compelling example comes from Brandi and colleagues (Brandi, Wohlschlager, Sorg, & Hermsdörfer, 2014) , who assessed three factors relevant to object manipulation: type of object (familiar tool plus recipient, or neutral bar shape plus "mounting" support), type of manipulation (use or Figure 2 . Schematic illustration of possible role of manipulation knowledge (ventro-dorsal stream) at several iterative stages of control and learning of tool actions. Manipulation knowledge consists of abstracted representations of prior viewed and/or performed tool use actions, including the visual appearance of the body and tools, abstract movement shape trajectory information, and somatosensory information, serving as target or goal states for feedback and feedforward control. Left: at Time 1 (T1) in a given episode, manipulation knowledge from prior experience is compared with the current state of the body and environment to generate a prediction of the motor command needed to achieve the target state. At Time 2 (T2), predicted sensory feedback is compared with the target state, and any mismatch (predicted error) is used to generate a final motor command aimed at minimizing the error. At Time 3 (T3), sensory feedback of the new body and environment states arising from the motor command adjusts the target state (learning). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
move), and the hand used. "Use" of the bar shape consisted of a planning-related movement task known as the "end state comfort" task derived from the work of Rosenbaum and colleagues (e.g., Rosenbaum, Vaughan, Barnes, & Jorgensen, 1992) . In this task, subjects must grasp a bar such that when they rotate it to place it down upon a support, their hand and arm will complete the task in a comfortable posture. The contrast tool versus bar showed a largely left-sided activation pattern with clusters in SMG, posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG), inferior occipital gyrus, anterior IPS, and SPL. These are regions that have been implicated in the tool use network on numerous prior occasions (e.g., Bi et al., 2015; Gallivan et al., 2013; Johnson-Frey et al., 2005 ; J. W. Lewis, 2006; Orban & Caruana, 2014) . To look specifically at tool use versus bar use, the contrast ((tool use-tool transport) -(bar use-bar transport)) was examined, and showed significant clusters in the SMG, ventral premotor cortex (PMv), MTG, and middle occipital gyrus in the left hemisphere. Finally, there was a stronger left-side lateralization for tool than bar in frontal, parietal, temporal, and sensorimotor cortex, regardless of the hand used. On the reasoning-based account, it is not clear why the bar and tool would be processed differently. That is, they should both be treated as objects not associated with any sensory-motor memories that must be optimally positioned and moved with respect to another object to achieve a desired goal (use in one case, insert into an opening on a mounting apparatus in the other). Both should be equivalently amenable to the strategy of using visual simulation plus knowledge of physical principles to achieve a desired goal. On the other hand, as noted by Brandi and colleagues (2014) , the results showing that relatively ventral and left lateralized activation occurs during the tool use task are consistent with our characterization of the ventro-dorsal stream (Binkofski & Buxbaum, 2013) , which is "important for processing the knowledge of specific learned object manipulations, such as tool use" (Brandi et al., 2014, p. 13192) . Moreover, they show that the ventro-dorsal stream is coactivated with MTG, a ventral stream area that plays a role in processing semantic information. Finally, they note that structural connections between MTG and SMG have been found in a prior diffusion tensor imaging study that aimed to find connections between regions necessary for tool use pantomime (Ramayya et al., 2010) .
In a number of interesting recent studies (e.g., Hoeren et al., 2013 Hoeren et al., , 2014 M. Martin et al., 2016; Vry et al., 2015) , the Freiburg group has used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Voxel-based lesion symptom mapping (VLSM), and diffusion tensor imaging to provide additional data that are highly supportive of two route accounts. Across these studies, the pattern that emerges is that accessing tool action meaning, whether during tool use observation or tool-related action, engages relatively ventral left hemisphere regions, including the pTC and SMG, whereas the spatiotemporal aspects of movement are encoded by bilateral regions, more dorsally. For example, Martin and colleagues (M. Martin et al., 2016 ) demonstrated in a sample of 136 left hemisphere stroke patients that spatiotemporal movement errors in tool use were associated with IPL lesions adjacent to the IPS, whereas content errors (perplexity, unrecognizable, or semantically incorrect movements) were associated with lesions in SMG and pTC. These and other data provide compelling evidence for two routes to tool-related actions.
In the next sections we will describe additional assumptions that constrain the 2ASϩ theoretical model.
Additional Assumptions of the 2AS؉ Theoretical Model
Skilled tool use is a complex, learned, task-sensitive behavior requiring a highly interactive, distributed neurocognitive architecture that is responsive to context, modulates competition and selection of goal-relevant actions, and enables learning. We expand on these capacities below.
Componentiality and Neuroanatomic Distribution
The cognitive components of tool use actions are subserved by a neuroanatomically distributed architecture consisting of densely interconnected regions of temporal, parietal, and frontal cortex, particularly in the left hemisphere (e.g., Brandi et al., 2014; Gallivan et al., 2013; A. Martin, 2007 ; M. Martin et al., 2015; Tarhan et al., 2015) . Moreover, cognitive representations enabling tool use planning and implementation are componential, and neuroanatomically distributed in a manner that reflects the underlying componential processes. Thus, for example, the component of manipulation knowledge drawing upon the retrieval of stored visual information about the appearance of tool actions rely upon cortical regions close to visual and motion-sensitive cortex in the temporooccipital and posterior temporal lobe (Bracci et al., 2012; Tarhan et al., 2015; Watson, Cardillo, Ianni, & Chatterjee, 2013) , whereas the component of manipulation knowledge that plays a role in the prediction of the tactile and kinesthetic consequences of movements rely on feedback and feedforward loops implemented in the parietal and frontal lobes (Hickok & Poeppel, 2004) .
Hierarchy, Context, and Role of "Top Down" Input
Complex skilled action is likely to be organized hierarchically, such that high level goals serve to activate nested goals at lower levels, which in turn can activate "means"-tool manipulation knowledge (Grafton & Hamilton, 2007; Kalénine, Mirman, Middleton, & Buxbaum, 2012) . Moreover, the tool manipulation knowledge that is activated at any given time is in part a function of context. "Context" may include task demands and intentions, recent actions performed, and expected forthcoming actions (e.g., Borghi, 2014; Kalénine, Shapiro, Flumini, Borghi, & Buxbaum, 2014; Lee, Middleton, Mirman, Kalénine, & Buxbaum, 2013) . For example, when one encounters a tool in the array, absent of the explicit intention to use it, activation of manipulation knowledge is influenced by other "bottom up" information, including episodic memories of what we have done before, other recently performed actions that may still be activated (i.e., manipulation knowledge for other recently encountered objects), and affordances (Jax & Buxbaum, 2010) . (Affordances refer to three dimensional shape and size attributes of manipulable objects that are suited to being manipulated by a particular actor.) When the goal is explicit tool use, additional strategic elements may come into play, including so-called "technical reasoning" (which in turn may include visual prediction of tool movement). In other words, the actor seeking to explicitly solve the problem of how to use a tool in a specific situation (e.g., to hammer a small nail in a cramped location) may This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
use technical reasoning to help solve details of the task; however, this reasoning serves to "tune" rather than replace the knowledge of what a hammering motion looks like and feels like-that is, manipulation knowledge). In addition, top down input driven by intention plays a role in organizing the system and in selecting task appropriate actions. Relevant representations (and attributes of the array) are activated and highlighted by attention, and/or irrelevant representations and array elements are suppressed (Botvinick, Buxbaum, Bylsma, & Jax, 2009; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Pavese & Buxbaum, 2002) . Such important considerations are absent from the reasoning-based account.
Multimodal, Temporally Independent Abstraction
Manipulation knowledge is comprised of multimodal representations that capture the invariant aspects of experience, abstracted over the multiple times we have used tools or observed them being used (e.g., Rijntjes, Weiller, Bormann, & Musso, 2012; van Elk et al., 2014) . Abstraction across temporal instances reduces the computational demand on storage and retrieval, and facilitates generalization of learning to similar (but not identical) exemplars. Multimodality of representations results in patterns of across-modality deficits in patients with action impairments, such as loss of knowledge of the sounds associated with tools (Pazzaglia, Pizzamiglio, Pes, & Aglioti, 2008) and impaired comprehension of actionrelated words (Fernandino et al., 2013) . The reasoning-based approach is unable to accommodate such data.
Reactivation and Prediction
Skilled tool use is neither a simple procedural skill nor based entirely on declarative memory. Instead, recall of how to use a tool, and actual tool use, involves reactivation of a broad swathe of the distributed neurocognitive system that supported initial learning of the tool use skill. One of the merits of reactivation is more accurate predictions of future states of the environment and of the body. For instance, ones memory of the manner of a tool's motion during tool use may be retrieved to enable prediction of how the tool should look while moving through the air on this (new) occasion. Thus, retrieval of the memory of a kinematic tool use trajectory, which serves as a "target" or goal state for how the trajectory should be shaped (a component of manipulation knowledge; see Figure 2 ), may enable faster and more accurate technical reasoning. Similarly, ones memories of how ones body looks and feels as it moves in a certain tool use action (e.g., hammering) serve as a desired or target state, useful for predicting how the body is supposed to look and feel while hammering. Any mismatch between this prediction and the executed action can tune the memory, and/or be used to correct the mismatch. Some may recognize this as a simplistic description of a much more complex process by which forward and inverse internal models are used for motor control (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Flanagan, 2001; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995) .
Manipulation knowledge also facilitates the rapid and accurate recognition of the actions of others (Tarhan et al., 2015) , and participates in the semantic representations of tools themselves. Whereas objects that we have learned about solely through visual, conversational, and text input appear to be represented primarily in terms of their perceptual and encylopedic features (dog and bear are semantically similar because they both have eyes, four legs, breathe, etc. (Cree & McRae, 2003; Farah & McClelland, 1991; Tyler & Moss, 2001) , objects that we have experience in touching and manipulating also appear to be represented in terms of their manipulation features (e.g., a hammer is swung with a characteristic trajectory; a hand gripping a hammer for use has a certain visual appearance). Moreover, the representations of tools and their recipient objects are encoded in terms of events in which they co-occur and are used together (de Zubicaray, Hansen, & McMahon, 2013; Kalénine et al., 2009; G. A. Lewis, Poeppel, & Murphy, 2015; Mirman & Graziano, 2012; Sass, Sachs, Krach, & Kircher, 2009; Schwartz et al., 2011) . Action plays a prominent, and perhaps central role in these thematic event relationships (Kalénine & Buxbaum, 2016; Tsagkaridis, Watson, Jax, & Buxbaum, 2014) . That is, we store knowledge that hammers and nails "go together" in a common "hammering event," and thus, tools and nails are linked in memory in part via manipulation knowledge. Manipulation knowledge facilities rapid tool recognition and rapid access to appropriate actions. Loss of manipulation knowledge is associated with slower tool recognition and overt action deficits in apraxia (Lee, Mirman, & Buxbaum, 2014) . O ϩ B do not address these data, except to suggest that manipulation knowledge may come into play only in nonaction tasks.
Competition and Action Selection
At any given time, numerous potential actions may be activated from both bottom-up and top-down input. For example, visual (and to a lesser degree, tactile and auditory) input provides us with numerous action choices (Botvinick et al., 2009; Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Pavese & Buxbaum, 2002; Schubotz, Wurm, Wittmann, & von Cramon, 2014) ; information about upcoming and recently performed task steps result in lingering and anticipatory activations of actions that may (or may not) be relevant in the present (Cooper & Schallice, 1997; Cooper & Shallice, 2000; Schwartz, 1995) . Moreover, even single objects may be compatible with numerous actions, which are frequently coactivated (Jax & Buxbaum, 2010 , 2013 Kalénine et al., 2014; . Skilled tool use requires a mechanism for rapid and flexible selection of task-relevant actions.
Lateralization
Left lateralization of prominent aspects of the tool use network, and the overlap of the network with systems mediating language comprehension and speech production, 1 is not an accident. Indeed, many of the functions performed during the transformation of information from idea to speech (e.g., during naming), from auditory input to speech (e.g., during repetition), and from auditory input to understanding (e.g., during comprehension) have important parallels to those used for tool action production, gesture imitation, and tool action recognition. Recent developments in two-route models of language (e.g., Hickok & Poeppel, 2004; Ueno, Saito, Rogers, & Lambon Ralph, 2011) have interesting parallels with the 2ASϩ model. In language, as in tool action, a network for knowledge and meaning, subserved by the temporal lobe, is integrated with a network that enables rapid sensory-motor mapping in the fronto-parietal cortex. The study of how language is understood, repeated, and produced, and the neural substrates of these processes, may be extremely informative with respect to our understanding of tool use actions (e.g., Gentilucci & Corballis, 2006) .
In the next section, we review evidence presented by O ϩ B that is said to be contrary to the "manipulation-based" account. Table 2 provides an overview of many of the main points of disparity between the reasoning-based and two-route approaches.
Evidence Claimed by Osiurak and Badets as Contrary to the Manipulation-Based Account

The End State Comfort Effect
O ϩ B cite a phenomenon we described above known as the "end state comfort effect" (ESC) to support their suggestion that tool actions are planned based on simulation of object motion, not simulation of body movements. O ϩ B say, ". . . mental simulation of the action (i.e., object's motion) constrains the goal posture and, as a result, the course of movements" (Rosenbaum, Meulenbroek, Vaughan, & Jansen, 2001 , p. 9, italics mine). However, in fact, Rosenbaum and colleagues' account is termed "posture based motor planning," and refers to the propensity to implicitly consider final body postures even before a movement is initiated.
As noted, evidence for the ESC has come from studies in which participants control hand pronation or supination when grasping a cylinder that must be upended in its move to another position. Inconsistent with the reasoning-based account, which posits that manipulation memories are discarded after tool use, Cohen and Rosenbaum (Cohen & Rosenbaum, 2004) showed that the formation of action plans is based on both generation and on recall of previous goal postures. Specifically, subjects were asked to perform multistage movements in which they grasped a dowel to move it from an intermediate-height shelf to a higher or lower shelf, then grasped it again to return it to the start position. Consistent with the ESC effect, the first grasp was made relatively lower (for moves to a higher shelf) or higher (for moves to the lower shelf) in anticipation of the dowel's final position. However, the second grasp for the "return" trajectory was made close to the position of the first grasp, despite the fact that it would no longer result in the most comfortable end state. These data are consistent with the possibility that the former posture was retrieved from memory, but not with the claim of O ϩ B that it is simulated motions of the object that are critical to the ESC (and see (Rosenbaum et al., 1992 , for a very similar conclusion).
In addition, O ϩ B's claim that movements of tools are simulated begs the question of how one can know how to simulate what the tool use action will look like unless there is retrieval of stored representations of prior tool movements. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how tool actions performed by others may be recognized otherwise. If O ϩ B concede that the visual appearance of tool movements may be stored, this, in turn, begs the question of the evidence that enables them to claim that disembodied visual tool movements are stored, but body movements are not.
Reference Frames
O ϩ B claim that motor plans are specified on line based solely on dynamic visual images (simulations of visual tool movements) plus relevant affordances, rather than based on predicted movement of the body. In contrast, O ϩ B claim that the manipulationbased approach hypothesizes "that people would store manipulation knowledge that is thought to be hand-centered, namely, effector-specific." (p. 10). In fact, the 2ASϩ account suggests that the aspects of tool use processing that are unilateral and left hemisphere-mediated are not effector specific, but are rather relatively abstract representations that have emerged over repeated experience in using tools and viewing tool use. Consider the "abstract kinematic trajectory" component of manipulation knowledge (see Figure 2) . A similar representation is posited by theories of motor control that include storage of a Generalized Motor Program (e.g., Schmidt & Lee, 2005) . To use an oft-cited example, ones handwriting has very similar characteristics whether the pen is used with the right or left hand, a foot, or the mouth. Moreover, the fact that left hemisphere representations subserve tool use with both hands is consistent with the fact that unilateral left hemisphere strokes cause bimanual apraxia (Heilman & Gonzalez- This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Rothi, 2003) . In contrast, aspects of tool action that are "further downstream," including programming of specific muscles, must of necessity be effector-specific. It is important to note that the fact that the brain encodes tool-to-body relationships (that may be effector-independent in early processing stages and effector-specific in later processing stages) does not preclude additional representations or processes that encode tool-to-recipient relationships. Our capacity to perform visual simulations of disembodied tools moving relative to objects has some support, as O ϩ B note. We suggest that different types of simulations (predictions) operate at different loci in the distributed tool use system. One possibility is that operating a tool with respect to a recipient object may emphasize online simulations of tool movements relative to another object, whereas tasks dependent upon moving the body in a certain manner (such as learning to use a tool by imitating another person) may rest relatively strongly upon tool-to-body relationships. That is, the task goal provides input to the entity (body or tool) for which movement is primarily simulated. In this context, we agree with O ϩ B: theorists claiming that specific tool use representations rather than tool structure (visual affordances) underlie tool-related stimulusresponse compatibility effects, termed the "orientation effect" by O ϩ B (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 2001 ), need to provide specific support for that proposal.
The Role of Semantic Memory in Tool Use
O ϩ B claim that "a significant body of evidence has shown that semantic memory and real tool use can be impaired independently from each other" (p. 7), and cite a number of prior studies as supporting this claim. However, it must be appreciated that "semantic memory" is an extraordinarily broad domain. Alex Martin (A. Martin, 2007) defines semantic memory as "a large division of long-term memory containing knowledge about the world including facts, ideas, beliefs, and concepts." (p. 26). In the clinical literature, dissociations have been reported between semantic memory for animate and inanimate objects (e.g., Warrington, 1975) , associative versus semantic knowledge of tools (e.g., Kalé-nine & Buxbaum, 2016) , and function and manipulation knowledge of tools (e.g., Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002) . One way to assess manipulation knowledge, for example, is to ask subjects to indicate whether two objects are manipulated the same way. While both function and manipulation knowledge are forms of conceptual knowledge about the world (i.e., semantic knowledge), prior evidence suggests that function knowledge deficits are in fact not a hallmark of apraxia (Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002) , whereas manipulation knowledge deficits are highly correlated with apraxia. O ϩ B are unclear in their presentation of this issue, simply lumping together all semantic knowledge. The claim of the manipulationbased account is simply that, as assessed by non-action tests, semantic knowledge of how to manipulate familiar tools (and not necessarily other types of semantic knowledge) is associated with actual performance on tests of pantomime and use of familiar tools.
There is ample evidence (including some acknowledged by O ϩ B, see pp. 23-25) that tool manipulation knowledge is activated in non-action cognitive tasks (e.g., Kalénine et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013 ; see also Ondobaka, de Lange, Wittmann, Frith, & Bekkering, 2015) . For example, Yee and colleagues, (Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, & Thompson-Schill, 2013) showed that semantic judgment and naming tasks with object words and pictures of objects were disrupted by the performance of a concurrent motor task, and that the amount of disruption was a function of how much experience participants had in using those objects. On the other hand, disruption of the same judgment and naming tasks by a concurrent visual task was not a function of manipulation experience. A number of studies from our lab have shown that when subjects search for a named object in an array, their eye gaze is influenced by other objects that are manipulated similarly (an index of competition). Moreover, apraxics show decreased competition from manipulation-related distractors. Critically, this reduction in competition is correlated with clinical apraxia scores and with lesions in the posterior temporal and parietal lobes (Lee et al., 2013; , but not with overall lesion size. That is, the lesions that cause deficits in the activation of manipulation knowledge in object identification tasks also cause overt apraxia on behavioral tasks.
The critical question O ϩ B raise is whether manipulation knowledge is also activated in action tasks involving tools. There are several strong suggestions that it is. Indeed, a study by Jarry and colleagues (Jarry et al., 2013) , on which Professor Osiurak is an author, showed that manipulation knowledge is correlated with tool use ability. Other evidence comes from Creem and Proffitt (Creem & Proffitt, 2001) , who showed that when subjects' task is to move a tool, they frequently rotate their hand into a pronated position with the thumb directed to the functional part of the tool, consistent with functional grasping, even though that was not necessary to the task. Moreover, this functional grasp effect disappeared when subjects performed a concomitant semantic task, but not when they performed a concomitant visual task. Randerath and colleagues (Randerath, Li, Goldenberg, & Hermsdörfer, 2009) later showed that apraxic patients showed a reduction of the functional grasping effect in the same paradigm. These studies indicate that manipulation knowledge plays a role in functional tool grasping.
Additional evidence for the activation of stored manipulation information during tool use comes from the difference in planning time for real tool use versus tool grasping. Tool use typically requires longer planning times than grasping to move. Valyear and colleagues (Valyear, Chapman, Gallivan, Mark, & Culham, 2011) found this to be the case even when the handles of tools were identical in grasping to move versus grasping to use tasks. Moreover, when tool use preceded or was intermixed with the transport task, the planning of grasp movements for transport was influenced, consistent with a change in motor strategy. In other words, planning of grasp movements was not solely influenced by the current problem that needed to be solved, as would be suggested by the technical reasoning account, but instead, prior (and forthcoming) actions influenced planning, consistent with memory for prior actions.
Another line of relevant evidence comes from the large number of studies that have assessed the effect of anticipation of object properties on grasping. For example, people match applied force to expected object weight (e.g., . The rate at which an object is lifted (load force rate) can be used to determine how much one knows about the object one is lifting. Peak load force rates are larger, for example, for objects known to be heavy. This relationship develops with age, and it is not until This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
about 6 -8 years that a smooth "bell-shaped" force profile develops, indicating that it is at this age that complete advance planning is achieved (Forssberg et al., 1992) . However, questions still persist about whether anticipatory load force planning reflects object-specific manipulation knowledge, or is rather based on visual size and shape cues. To answer this question, we (Dawson, Buxbaum, & Duff, 2010) capitalized on a prior observation from our laboratory showing that apraxics are impaired when attempting to match pictures of familiar tools with pictures of manipulation hand postures, but were significantly less impaired when they matched pictures of novel objects with pictures of hand postures suitable for exploring the objects. This suggested that they do not suffer a generic deficit in representing or predicting hand postures for interacting with three dimensional shapes (i.e., they can respond to object affordances), but rather suffer a deficit in storing and/or retrieving previously learned manipulation knowledge. If this claim is correct, we reasoned that apraxic patients would show the same dissociation in their grasping and lifting of novel versus familiar objects. Indeed, as we predicted, apraxics' load force rate was abnormal on Trial 1 with familiar objects, but normal with novel objects. Moreover, the abnormal load force rate measure correlated significantly with a common measure of apraxia, gesture to the sight of tools. Moreover, lesion analysis indicated that the posterior middle temporal gyrus, the region repeatedly implicated in manipulation knowledge (e.g., Chao & Martin, 2000) , was associated with abnormal Trial 1 load force rate. The abnormal grasping performance of apraxics with familiar (but not novel) objects was also demonstrated by Sunderland and colleagues (Sunderland, Wilkins, & Dineen, 2011) , who showed omission of the rotation of the hand that precedes grasping of familiar objects. Recall that O ϩ B posit that if manipulation knowledge exists at all, it is only activated in nontool tasks. It is not clear how this account can accommodate deficits in grasping familiar objects in the context of normal performance with novel objects. The 2ASϩ account suggests that two systems are differentially recruited with the two object types: grasping of novel objects relies most strongly on the dorso-dorsal route, whereas additional recruitment of the ventro-dorsal stream aids in functional grasping of familiar objects.
Other compelling evidence in support of manipulation knowledge comes from the observation that the network that is active during tool use changes as a result of training. For example, Rüther and colleagues (Rüther, Tettamanti, Cappa, & Bellebaum, 2014) assessed neural activation to a set of novel functional objects before and after subjects watched an experimenter manipulating them. As compared to objects that were merely observed visually, the action observation training resulted in increased activation in a left hemisphere network including IFG, SMG, and angular gyrus when subjects again viewed the objects. These data indicate that experience in observing object use results in changes in the representations of objects. This is consistent with the 2ASϩ account, which specifically proposes that learned manipulation knowledge is a component of tool representations.
Finally (but not exhaustively), as O ϩ B note on pp. 23-25, there is a great deal of evidence that manipulation knowledge is different than the structure-based (affordance) information that is computed online, and that the two may compete with one another. Importantly, this evidence comes not only from nonaction cognitive tasks, as O ϩ B claim, but also from action tasks. We recently assessed the performance of left hemisphere stroke patients on an action production task in which grasp-to-move and use actions for a tool were congruent or incongruent  see Figure 3 ). The tools in both groups were matched for familiarity, affordance strength, name agreement, and (in a subset analysis) number of moveable parts. We also used voxel-based lesion symptom mapping (VLSM) and tractographic overlap analyses to determine brain regions associated with deficits in selecting between the two action types, and assessed whether this selection difficulty constitutes a subtype of apraxia. When pantomiming the use of familiar tools, the accuracy of hand actions of stroke patients (but not of control subjects) was significantly affected by conflicting use and grasp actions.
2 VLSM analyses revealed that lesions to the SMG, IFG/anterior insula, and SLF was associated with this pattern.
It is important to note that the role of SMG, specifically, in storage of hand and limb postures for functional object interaction has been noted before (Pelgrims, Olivier, & Andres, 2011; Vingerhoets, 2008) . The 2ASϩ account posits that SMG does not "store" postures, per se, but accumulates potential candidate actions, perhaps in a relatively abstract sensory-motor format (in which particular muscle forces are not yet specified), before selection of a task appropriate action. This is similar to the account of Schubotz and colleagues, who propose that activation in SMG, PM, and insula "increases with the competition load between object-evoked action options" (Schubotz et al., 2014, p. 10 ). Moreover, SMG shows strong left-lateralized connectivity with the posterior temporal lobe, a critical substrate of manipulation knowledge (e.g., Kalénine, Buxbaum, & Coslett, 2010; A. Martin, 2007) . We found that apraxic patients who exhibited larger effects of competition between use and grasp actions tended to share lesions in left SMG, while apraxic patients who exhibited smaller effects of use/grasp competition tended to share lesions in left posterior temporooccipital cortex (lateral occipital cortex and pMTG), though lesion volumes were the same in the two groups. Finally, the nature of the errors made by patients-multiple incorrect attempts and inappropriate prehensile responses-were consistent with inappropriate selection of grasping actions (instead of use actions) or difficulty selecting single actions. By contrast, use/grasp competition did not affect action recognition. We proposed that this pattern of results reflects an SMG/SLF/IFG pathway that implements biased competition between possible tool actions. The reasoning-based hypothesis appears unable to account for such data. 2 We used pantomime rather than actual tool use because spatiotemporal abnormalities in pantomime are a classic hallmark of apraxia. Jax and Buxbaum (Jax & Buxbaum, 2013) showed that apraxics were also subject to abnormal reach/grasp competition when they positioned their hands on objects as if to use them. Moreover, accuracy on pantomime is very strongly correlated with accuracy in actual tool use (Jarry et al., 2013) as are movement errors in the two tasks (Hermsdörfer, Li, Randerath, RobyBrami, & Goldenberg, 2013) . Finally, pantomime accuracy is predictive of tool errors in real life tasks (Foundas et al., 1995) . We note parenthetically that the reasoning-based account explains the strong correlation of pantomime and tool use by positing that, in pantomime without an object, all of the steps of the reasoning based approach are applied to mental images of a tool and recipient object retrieved from semantic memory. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
The Size Effect Is Not Influenced by Object Use
O ϩ B review the considerable literature on the object size effect, in which various responses (e.g., categorization responses) to objects are made more rapidly when the response is made with a hand grip (power or precision) that is congruent with the size of the object, despite the irrelevance of the hand posture or object size to the response in question. Numerous investigators (e.g., Thill et al., 2013) have assumed that these data suggest that manipulation knowledge is automatically activated by the mere observation of tools. O ϩ B rightly suggest that, for the most part, there have been no demonstrations that manipulation knowledge is evoked when participants make power or precision responses. However, one exception to this criticism comes from a study we performed with neurologically healthy subjects assessing whether the object size effect was influenced by the visual context in which objects were presented (Kalénine et al., 2014) . Objects associated with distinct move and use responses, such as a kitchen timer, were presented in contexts consistent with a power grip response for moving the object (such as a kitchen drawer or shelf), or in a functional context consistent with a precision grip for using the object (such as a kitchen countertop with food and a baking pan; see Figure 4 ). Subjects' task was simply to indicate by means of a precision or power grip whether the object was natural or manmade. Response times were significantly faster in the use context (as compared with the move context) in the precision grip condition as compared to the power grip condition. In other words, subjects were faster to produce "use relevant" hand responses when objects were presented in a context that was consistent with their use. These data indicate that implicit activation of use manipulation knowledge does play a role in the object size effect, and is influenced by context.
An interesting question is whether the above effects of action incongruence might be attributable to a relatively late-stage assessment of the "costs" of moving the body in a particular manner, as O ϩ B's account suggests. However, why would these costs of manipulating the object in a particular way be assessed in tasks in which the tool use movement is irrelevant, such as in a semantic categorization task? The reasoning-based approach appears unable to accommodate such findings. In summary, considerable evidence suggests that manipulation knowledge is activated in nonaction cognitive tasks as well as in action tasks.
The Role of Motor Learning in Tool Use
O ϩ B claim that most tool use is not subject to procedural motor learning. The type of learning that facilitates tool use, instead, is said to be learning of physics principles, that is, "acquisition of key functional parameters (i.e., mechanical knowledge)" (p. 28). To support this assertion, they cite the fact that patients with Parkinson's disease, known to have deficits in procedural motor learning, may perform relatively well on everyday tool-use activities. However, a recent study by Roy and colleagues (Roy, Park, Roy, & Almeida, 2015) took a careful look at the question of the role of procedural and declarative knowledge in the tool use of Parkinson's disease patients. Patients with PD showed normal acquisition of novel tool use skills but failed to retain performance across sessions, consistent with a motor learning impairment. Their declarative recall of tool attributes was normal. The authors suggested that a cooperative interaction between declarative and procedural learning systems is required for skilled tool use.
As noted earlier, O ϩ B do concede that procedural learning is required for more arbitrarily used tools such as phones and computers. In a sense, then, O ϩ B entertain a two-route model. However, unlike the 2ASϩ model, which posits that the two routes are complementary, with the degree of activation of each route dependent upon context and goals, the O ϩ B model appears to indicate that a given tool action is handled solely by one route or the other. Moreover, the division between tools that are said to Figure 3 . Voxel-based lesion symptom mapping analysis showing regions in the supramarginal gyrus and anterior insula/inferior frontal gyrus significantly predicting poor performance on tools associated with distinct "use" and "move" actions ("conflict" tools) controlling for performance on "nonconflict" tools. From "A Distributed Network Critical for Selecting Among Tool-Directed Actions," by C. E. Watson and L. J. Buxbaum, 2015, Cortex, 65, p. Kalénine et al. (2014) to demonstrate that tool (e.g., kitchen timer) use representations are significantly more activated in visual contexts consistent with use (e.g., kitchen countertop) than move (e.g., kitchen drawer). From "Visual Context Modulates Potentiation of Grasp Types During Semantic Object Categorization," by S. Kalénine, A. D. Shapiro, A. Flumini, A. M. Borghi, and L. J. Buxbaum, 2014, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 21, p. 647. Copyright 2014 by Springer. See the online article for the color version of this figure. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
require procedural motor learning and those that are alleged not to require such learning is not discussed. This is a critical point, as there are many tools for which use requires actions that are not clearly discernible from visible affordances (e.g., cigarette lighter, glue stick, electric drill) and in which instructions and/or observation of use are required for action learning. A study from our laboratory (Barde, Buxbaum, & Moll, 2007 ) (reviewed by O ϩ B) provides evidence that at least some apraxics exhibit deficits in motor learning, and abnormal reliance on affordances during learning. Patients with left hemisphere stroke, with and without apraxia, were trained to perform and recognize the actions associated with novel tools over multiple trials. Half of the tools were judged in a normative study to strongly afford the actions paired with them, whereas the other half weakly afforded their actions. Only patients with apraxia demonstrated better learning of highly afforded actions. Moreover, the patients showing this pattern had sparing of the dorso-dorsal processing stream in the context of damage to the ventro-dorsal processing stream. These data are consistent with the proposal that two routes mediate skilled tool actions, one specialized for stored information, and the other responsive to object structure, and that deficient gesture learning may be compensated by "bootstrapping" intact dorsodorsal stream coding. In summary, the evidence reviewed indicates that motor learning plays a role in use of tools.
The Association of Tool Use and Technical Reasoning Abilities in Apraxia
O ϩ B note that a strong correlation has been demonstrated between tool use and technical reasoning in left hemisphere lesioned patients, suggesting that these two skills are based upon common underlying mechanisms. However, the correlation of tool use and technical reasoning does not, of course, preclude the correlation of tool-use and other abilities. For example, as noted earlier, tool use and technical reasoning are also correlated with pantomime to the sight of tools (Goldenberg & Hagmann, 1998; Jarry et al., 2013) , and characteristic errors are consistent across pantomime and tool use tasks (Hermsdörfer, 2014; Hermsdörfer, Li, Randerath, Goldenberg, & Johannsen, 2012; Hermsdörfer et al., 2013) . One rejoinder might be that tool use and pantomime to the sight of tools are correlated because they are both dependent on technical reasoning. Then, however, it would be necessary to explain the fact that pantomime and gesture recognition are also correlated (Tarhan et al., 2015) . Does this indicate that gesture recognition also depends on technical reasoning?
One can hopefully appreciate that such an approach leads to potentially endless iterations of multiple correlated tasks in which shared underlying mechanisms are inferred. In our laboratory we have taken an approach in which we begin with a neurocognitive model that predicts the association of various brain regions with various abilities. In our lesion approach, we use conjunction analyses to look at regions critical for two or more tasks, as well as residual analyses to partial out the shared variance between tasks and ask which brain regions contribute uniquely to the variance that remains. These approaches enabled us to demonstrate, for example, that although pantomime to the sight of tools and tool action recognition depend on shared regions in a distributed fronto-temporal-parietal network (and presumably share the activation of manipulation knowledge), gesture recognition (that has no motor output requirement) disproportionately depends on the left posterior temporal portion of the network, whereas pantomime to the sight of tools depends on fronto-parietal cortex (in addition to the posterior temporal lobe). It would be interesting to perform similar analyses using technical reasoning, imitation of meaningless actions, and tool use pantomime. We predict that, as compared with technical reasoning, tool use pantomime will disproportionately depend on the posterior temporal lobe (because of the activation of manipulation knowledge), whereas technical reasoning and imitation of meaningless gestures should disproportionately rely on the fronto-parietal portion of the network (because manipulation knowledge is not required). This kind of careful lesion analysis work, we believe, has the potential to identify major subtypes of apraxia resulting from temporal versus fronto-parietal damage, as well as explaining why characteristics of both of these subtypes are frequently observed after large strokes (see Tarhan et al., 2015 for discussion).
Parsimony and the Function(s) of the Parietal Lobe
Toward the end of their detailed manuscript, O ϩ B struggle to reconcile the findings of the reasoning based and manipulation based accounts. Particularly troubling to them is that . . . a significant body of evidence has indicated that tool use is impaired after left inferior parietal lobe lesions, leading to the idea that this brain region is critical for storing manipulation knowledge or mechanical knowledge. So, given that there is one brain region for two types of knowledge, the challenge would be to demonstrate the existence of both. In addition, any attempt to integrate the two approaches within a coherent framework would be confronted with a lack of parsimony. The problematic issue would be to explain the interest offered by manipulation knowledge given that another system is supposed to adapt movements to the current tool-use action (i.e., affordance perception and actualization. (p. 28) To my understanding, O ϩ B believe that (a) the parietal lobe is not likely to subserve both manipulation knowledge (sensorimotor representations) as well as mechanical knowledge (understanding of physical principles such as leverage), (b) any account that posits the existence of both types of information as relevant to tool use is unnecessarily complex.
We have reviewed a number of lines of evidence that the left posterior parietal lobe (along with the posterior temporal lobe) does indeed participate in the storage, buffering, and retrieval of manipulation knowledge, and we have provided a neurocognitive model of the tool use system that posits a role for online simulation and prediction of tool actions (in the dorso-dorsal stream) as well as retrieval of prior instances of tool action (in the ventro-dorsal stream). As we hope to have made clear, we believe that there are a number of reasons why manipulation knowledge is highly likely to complement technical reasoning, and to be important for the brain and for the organism. Reactivation of previously stored memories saves time and effort as compared with recalculating information de novo each time a tool is viewed. Manipulation knowledge is critical for action recognition and enables rapid prediction of how others' actions are likely to unfold. And, we suggest, manipulation knowledge provides "targets" or desired states of the way the body, tools, and movement trajectories should look and feel when a given This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
action is programmed, enabling detection and correction of error.
Conclusion
In this commentary we hope to have clarified the relationship between the reasoning-based approach to tool use espoused by O ϩ B and "two route" approaches, of which our own account, the 2ASϩ model, is a recent detailed example (and see Gonzalez Rothi et al., 1997; Hoeren et al., 2013 Hoeren et al., , 2014 Rumiati et al., 2005; Rumiati & Humphreys, 1998) . Taken together, the evidence suggests that tool use is enabled by stored representations of how tool use looks and feels, in addition to processes enabling visual predictions based on tool and recipient attributes and knowledge of physical principles (i.e., technical reasoning). We may speculate, further, that although both routes work cooperatively, the relative reliance on one route or another may be a function of context (see Tessari, Canessa, Ukmar, & Rumiati, 2007 for an example) and of the integrity of each route. Rather than suffering from a lack of parsimony, models such as the one we have proposed are required to explain the wide range of flexible human tool-related behaviors, including pantomime, recognition, learning, and selection between multiple potential actions. In addition, two-route accounts such as ours are compatible with numerous recent neuroimaging findings. The reasoning-based approach, while thought-provoking and meritorious in some regards, is not well-equipped to respond to the existing data across all of these domains.
